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Abstract
Traditional security models are out of place in peer networks, where no hierarchy ex-
ists, and where no outside channel can be relied upon. In this nontraditional environment
we must provide traditional security properties and assure fairness in order to enable the
secure, collaborative success of the network. One solution is to form a Trusted Domain,
and exclude perceived dishonest and unfair members.
Previous solutions have been intolerant of masquerading, and have suffered from a
lack of precise control over the allocation and exercise of privileges within the Trusted
Domain. Our contribution is the introduction of a model that allows for controlled access
to the group, granular control over privileges, and guards against masquerading. Contin-
ued good behavior is rewarded by an escalation of privileges, while requiring an increased
commitment of resources. Bad behavior results in expulsion from the Trusted Domain.
In colluding with malicious nodes, well behaved nodes risk losing privileges gained over
time; collusion is thereby discouraged.
We implement our solution on top of the Bouncer Toolkit, produced by Narasimha et
al. [25], as a prototype Peer to Peer file sharing network. We make use of social models for
trust [24] [30] [26], and rely on new cryptographic primitives from the field of Threshold
Cryptography. We present the results of an experimental analysis of its performance for
a number of thresholds, and present observations on a number of important performance
and security improvements that can be made to the underlying toolkit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Peer networks exhibit several interesting properties that make the application of tradi-
tional security techniques difficult [20]. Despite this difficulty, the application of some
technique is necessary if the peer group is to operate securely. We begin by examining
the environment of a peer network.
In a peer group, a number of network hosts collaborate to achieve some collective
goal. In a Mobile Ad-Hoc Wireless Network (MANET), for example, where no access
point is present and therefore wireless nodes act as both senders and routers of packets,
each wireless host collaborates to provide the basic network services of routing and traffic
forwarding for the group [31]. Wireless hosts achieve this by forming a Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) network. Another example, with greater significance to this thesis, is a P2P File
Sharing network such as Gnutella [8]. In this case, lacking any central point of control or
authority, hosts collaborate to exchange files, again forming a P2P network to do so. In
both examples, there is a need for fair, secure collaboration to achieve the common goal.
Within a peer group, no hierarchy is initially assumed, and all nodes are given equal
authority. Furthermore, no channel to nodes outside of the peer network is assumed to
exist. In particular, these assumptions make it difficult to use traditional Public Key (PKI)
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[12] techniques in this setting. Given the lack of an outside channel, no Certification
Authority (CA) can be reliably made use of to determine authenticity. Given the lack of a
hierarchy, no single host can be given a fixed role in the network, such as that of an acting
CA for the group; trust would have to be arbitrarily placed in such a host, as there is no
means of initially assessing whether it is more or less trustworthy than any other node in
the group. Furthermore, such an assignment creates a single point of failure.
Finally, a peer group should operate in an ad-hoc manner, integrating new nodes with-
out prerequisite. This further increases the challenge of designing security mechanisms
suitable to such a group, as no preexisting Security Association (SA) can be made use of.
In the case of the MANET, this means that lower layer security mechanisms such as WEP
[13] may not be used, as they require a prior SA. This requirement, in combination with
the lack of fixed roles and a CA, often makes it difficult to verify hosts as being unique,
and causes masquerading to be a problem.
In the face of these many complexities, nodes must still uphold traditional security
properties such as data integrity and authenticity in order for the network to function
securely. Furthermore, nodes must act fairly, otherwise selfish nodes can degrade the
result of collaboration. It is a unique challenge to implement security services and provide
fairness in such an environment.
In this paper we present a new model that allows for the ad-hoc formation of peer
groups, while providing traditional security properties, and assuring the fair operation of
the network. Trust in honest members is increased over time, and privileges can be ex-
tended to trustworthy members with granularity. Dishonest members are detected and
expelled from the group. Our model improves on existing work which limits trust to a
binary relationship (all or none), and which does not allow for privileges to be issued
with granularity. Furthermore, our model incorporates elements which can be used to
discourage or even prevent masquerading, which is a considerable problem in prior mod-
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els. We make use of social models for trust [30] [24], and rely on new cryptographic
primitives from the field of Threshold Cryptography. We introduce these new materials
in immediately following sections, and then proceed to describe our model.
1.1 Secret Sharing and Threshold Cryptography
Our work makes considerable use of new cryptographic primitives, primarily Threshold
Cryptography. While reliance on a CA is not possible in a peer group given the constraints
discussed in § 1, the use of Threshold Cryptography allows this role to be distributed
between some or all members in such a way as to allow a subset of the group to perform
signing in place of the CA. The principle cryptographic primitive used by our work is a
threshold variation of the RSA algorithm which we refer to as TS-RSA [21]. The TS-
RSA algorithm uses Shamir’s Secret Sharing [29] technique to share an RSA private key
amongst group members. This technique is based on Lagrange Polynomial interpolation
[29]. We present these concepts concisely below, and refer the reader to the sources for
further details.
In Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [29], a secret S is broken into n pieces, any t of
which may later collaborate to recover the secret. Such a system can be called a (t, N)
secret sharing scheme. Some threshold cryptographic systems make use of techniques
known collectively as proactive secret sharing which allow t to increase for each increase
inN . We focus our attention here on static systems in which this is note the case, and refer
the reader to Herzberg et al. [18] for further details. Initially, a trusted dealer chooses a
large prime q and selects a polynomial f (z) over Zq of degree t− 1 such that
f (0) = S (1.1)
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Each share of the secret ssi ∈ (ss1, ss2, ..., ssn) is computed as in Equation (1.2) and
is securely dealt to the node i.
ssi = f (i) mod q (1.2)
Using the Lagrange Polynomial Interpolation formula in Equation (1.3) any t nodes
may then recover the secret.
f (z) =
t∑
i=1
ssi · li (z) (mod q) (1.3)
Any fewer than t collaborating nodes may not recover S and may gain no informa-
tion about it. Each publicly available lagrange coefficient li is calculated as in Equa-
tion (1.4) [25].
li (z) =
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
z − j
i− j (mod q) (1.4)
Many Threshold Cryptographic primitives, such as the Threshold RSA scheme pre-
sented by Kong et al. in [21], use an existing public-key algorithm, in this case RSA,
where the secret S is the private key, which is distributed amongst n nodes. While not all
Threshold Cryptographic systems allow it, in their work, Kong et al. propose a system
by which any t nodes may issue partial signatures using the shared private key. These
signatures may be reconstituted by the recipient into a full signature, signed by the group
private key, on some message M . In this way, t nodes may make use of the shared private
key S while never disclosing the group secret to any one node. We briefly present this
work and refer the reader to [21] for further details.
To issue a partial signature on a message M , a node i treats its partial share ssi as the
exponent in the RSA algorithm, computing
4
M ssi mod q (1.5)
The recipient of t such partial signatures is able to combine them to form a full sig-
nature on M signed by the group private key; one obstacle remains to this reassembly,
which we now address.
Given f (0) = S (Equation (1.1)), we may restate Equation (1.3) as
d = S =
t∑
i=1
ssi · li (0) (mod q) (1.6)
For some value, j, we can also say that
∑t
i=1 ssi·li (0) (mod q) = j ·q+d [21]. How-
ever, there can be no mathematical assurance that M j·q+d ≡ Md ≡ MS (mod q). Kong
et al. overcome this problem through the use of what they term the K-bounded coalition
offsetting algorithm1. This algorithm makes use of the group public key PK =< e, n >,
and functions as follows.
Figure 1.1: K-Bounded Coalition Offsetting Algorithm
Z =M−n mod q
l = 0
while l ≤ K and M 6≡ Y e (mod q) do
Y = Y · Z mod q
l = l + 1
done
Result: Y ≡Md mod q
This algorithm ensures that the result of combining the partial signatures on M is
equivalent to a full signature on M using the group private key. The use of partial signa-
tures and the algorithm above let us assign the role of a CA to some subset of a peer group
with a number of useful provisions. We can tolerate some number of faulty or malicious
1In this case K = t, the threshold.
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nodes less than t, while still allowing the group CA to function as intended, and without
compromising S.
Furthermore, because t nodes are required to sign for some message M in order to
fully sign as S, we create a proxy for consensus that demands that t nodes agree to sign
some message M . If entrance into the peer group were based on this proxy, for example,
then by obtaining a group signature on some message M a node can prove that it was
accepted for entrance. This idea of a threshold t as a proxy for consensus is explored in
two relevant papers, each of which we now present briefly.
1.2 Prior Work
In their research (see [31]), Yang and colleagues sought a solution that secured routing
and packet forwarding in a MANET. In their solution nodes secure those two services
through the formation of a Trusted Domain (TD) within the peer network. Within the TD,
members are monitored promiscuously and a (t, N) threshold-shared private key is used
to certify fair and honest nodes by signing tokens for each member. Each token is signed
only if t neighboring nodes have observed that some node i has not acted maliciously,
having routed and forwarded packets as required. Members acting unfairly or maliciously
are expelled when their tokens expire and no coalition of t neighbors signs a new token.
Data integrity and authenticity between nodes is upheld through the use of private keys
held by each node.
Narasimha et. al. (see [25]), further explored the concept of trust in a MANET. Specif-
ically, they explored the problem of controlling admission of nodes to a Trusted Domain
such as the one introduced by Yang et al. Their work abstracted the problem of safe-
guarding membership in a Trusted Domain, creating a framework that could express the
requirements for membership in a general way. Their implementation of this framework,
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which they termed the Bouncer Toolkit, implemented a number of threshold cryptographic
primitives. An arbitrary peer group can be implemented on top of the toolkit by select-
ing the appropriate signature scheme and membership requirements. We introduce a new
model that makes use of this framework, benefiting from the ideas presented in both of
these papers.
Prevention of masquerading proved to be a shortcoming of both the work of Narasimha
et al. and Yang et al. In their work, Yang et al. [31] chose to use the MAC address of a
wireless node was used to ensure that no one node received more than one share of the
group secret, or was able to sign more than once on a token for some node. The MAC
is known to be easily forgeable, however, and should not be used for this purpose. In
Narasimha et al. a certificate signed by a CA was required of each node applying for
membership to some peer group. While this offloaded the problem of masquerading on
to the CA, it created a requirement for admission that invalidated the possibility of ad-hoc
group formation.
Prior work has also suffered from a lack of precise control over the allocation and ex-
ercise of privileges within the TD. This lack of granularity means that sometimes nodes
must be trusted with sensitive capabilities that might otherwise be witheld from them,
lowering the overall security of the Trusted Domain. In both of the works referred to
above, a node is either a member of the TD or not, and members may exercise any privi-
lege granted to TD nodes. Our model provides granular control over privileges, breaking
the TD up into a number of levels at which a node may participate. Each level contains
a set of privileges which a node at that level may exercise. At higher levels, a greater in-
vestment of resources is required, and a greater set of privileges are allowed. Our model
guards against masquerading by requiring nodes to commit greater resources at higher
levels, and over time. Continued good behavior by fair and honest nodes is rewarded in
this way. Bad behavior results in expulsion from the Trusted Domain. In colluding with
7
malicious nodes, well behaved nodes risk losing privileges gained over time; collusion is
thereby discouraged.
In the following section, § 2, we discuss the rationale for the model upon which our
work is based. Following that, in § 3, we discuss he implementation of the model as a
Peer to Peer (P2P) file sharing network build on top of the Bouncer Toolkit, using the
TS-RSA algorithm as the underlying threshold cryptographic primitive. Finally, in § 4
and § 5, we present the results of performance and scalability testing based on laboratory
experimentation with our implementation.
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Chapter 2
The Model
The model which we now present is intended as a solution to providing essential security
properties and fairness in a peer group, while allowing ad-hoc formation and dealing with
the problem of masquerading. Our model is founded on a number of essential assump-
tions which are roughly derived from observations of social behavior, and which we now
discuss.
Consider two people, Alice and Bob, who have just met for the first time. Neither
trusts the other person, but they both wish to accomplish some task that neither alone can
complete. Let us assume that both see that they must unite to accomplish the task, and
that they begrudgingly join forces to get the job done. Alice labors to complete her part of
the task while Bob labors to complete his. If each periodically shows the other the work
that they have completed, over time they will both come to trust that each is working
hard for the collective good. As long as Alice and Bob decide on a suitable period, then
the most undesirable thing Bob can do as far as Alice is concerned is stop working just
after he shows Alice his work. This would mean Alice continued to labor for an entire
additional period, while Bob stood by. Presumably, next time Alice saw Bob’s work, she
would realize he had been lazy, and would decide not to continue to work with him.
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On the other hand, the longer Bob continues to work hard, the longer Alice can see
that he shares the same goal as her, and is therefore likely to continue to work hard. Let
us assume that it takes a bit of time for Alice to walk over to where Bob is working,
observe that he has completed the work expected of him, and then walk back to where
she is working and begin again. Over time, Alice will grow to trust that each time she
makes a record of Bob’s work, it will be as she expected.
Alice can propose to Bob that they increase the period at which they check in with each
other. In doing so, she has admitted to some increased trust of Bob, given his continued
good behavior, and has exercised this increased trust by way of increasing the check-in
period. She can never be completely sure that Bob is not out to cheat her. But she grows
increasingly more confident that Bob is honest and fair, because he has committed so
much of his time and energy to completing their shared task. So the assumption is that
because Bob has invested so heavily into completing the task, he will not jeopardize its
completion by being lazy; rather, he will continue to work hard.
Eventually, Alice and Bob will complete what they set out to do. Before they part
ways, Alice gives Bob a token that tells the rest of the world to what extent Alice approves
of Bob. Later, if Bob runs across another person who wishes to join him in completing
some other shared task, he can use the token to show them that he has already established
a rapport with Alice.
Our model is predicated upon the observations above. We start by assuming that
some core group of nodes trust each other mutually. Each new node that wishes to take
part in the peer group is invited to do so as long as enough members approve; the first
time a node joins a group members always approve. Over time, its behavior is observed,
and offered increased privileges. With the increase in privileges comes an increase in
expected participation. As more members are added to the group, the number of observers
increases, each one adding their unique perspective. In total, their collective wisdom is
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more accurate than the wisdom of a single individual, to the benefit of the group.
If at any time a node acts maliciously, unfairly, or fails to commit the resources re-
quired of it for participation, it is expelled from the peer group. Honest, fair nodes are
discouraged from being malicious or colluding with malicious members because in doing
so they risk losing their membership. Members receive tokens proving their membership
and validating their participation. The model can be used iteratively, with one peer group
requiring membership in a more junior peer group a criteria for joining. In this way,
malicious or dishonest members may be filtered out as they proceed upward through a
hierarchy of peer groups.
The social model presented above is suitable for situations in which some degree
of misbehavior can be tolerated. Bob can always choose to misbehave at some level,
and for however long it goes undetected, this behavior must be accepted. In a situation
where the result of misbehavior is serious, the model can still be used, but over time,
given increasingly more observers, the ability to detect and expel members is increased.
Thus, the longer the model is used in such a situation, the greater its ability to deal with
misbehavior.
2.1 Construction of the Initial Group
Our model begins with a number of peer nodes coming together to form a Trusted Do-
main, a process which we term Initial Group Construction. As stated in the previous
section, the model must be used in a largely honest environment if it is to function prop-
erly. In particular, the number of colluding dishonest nodes should not be equal to or
exceed the threshold t. If the Initial Group forms with a number of dishonest nodes at
least equal to t, then the group is compromised from the start. The easiest way to form a
TD with the desired properties is for a number of nodes with prior knowledge or out-of-
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band experience with each other to form it. We note that this may not be possible in an
entirely ad-hoc setting, however.
We present a technique for initial group formation that guarantees that group forma-
tion occurs as desired. From the Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP) [22], we know that
given any 3m+1 honest parties, even in the presence of m malicious parties we can form
an initial group P0 and defeat attempts by m nodes to disrupt its formation. Let us assume
m = 1 malicious nodes, and therefore 3m + 1 = 4 total nodes. Call these nodes p1...p4,
and let pn refer to any single p ∈ {p0...p4}. Let us assume that each node possesses a
cryptographic certificate that is verifiable as belonging to the owner. Let us assume that
all 4 nodes have such certificates, with public keys for these certificates known to all other
nodes.
P0 forms between two times, T0 and T1 (T0 < T1). Starting from time T0, all pn
use a distributed threshold cryptographic algorithm to bootstrap a shared private key with
threshold t. Again using a Byzantine Agreement Protocol, at least 3m = 3 honest nodes
posses shares of the shared private key at the conclusion of the exchange. Note that it is
necessary to bound the threshold t between m + 1 = 2 and 3m = 3 above, given m = 1
potentially malicious nodes. Failure to bound t in this way would allow for the creation
of an unusable key, or a key which was insufficiently distributed amongst pn such that m
nodes could compromise the group secret key. We therefore assume honest behavior by
at most 3m nodes during the exchange, and accommodate malicious behavior by at most
m.
Between T0 and T1 it is assumed that no honest node becomes malicious, and all
honest nodes participate in the exchange. The actual value of the interval between T0 and
T1 is unimportant as long as the assumptions hold for that interval. The exchange could
take place over seconds or days. Typically a short exchange provides little opportunity
for attack, and so would therefore be a more suitable choice than a long interval. Once
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T1 elapses, at least 3m = 3 members of pn have formed the peer group which we now
simply term P .
Recall that the group P has formed in order to collaborate to achieve some goal.
The exact details of how they will collaborate is articulated in a Group Charter (GC), an
X.509 Certificate [19]. There are a number of ways in which all pn can agree upon a
GC. If the group is forming entirely ad-hoc, perhaps the easiest way is to select one of a
number of predefined charters that might exist. Otherwise, a voting algorithm might be
used. Once the GC is decided upon, it is partially signed by each pn, and bound to the
group public key. The GC contains at minimum the following elements.
Figure 2.1: Group Charter Elements
• An NxN Policy Matrix O

o0,renwal o0,upgrade . . . o0,N
o1,renwal o1,upgrade . . . o1,N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
oN,renewal oN,upgrade . . . oN,N

• An NxN Capabilities Matrix A

a0,0 a0,1 . . . a0,N
a1,0 a1,1 . . . a1,N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aN,0 aN,1 . . . aN,N

• The Threshold Cryptographic primitive to be used
• The initial threshold t
These values essentially define the group, and the requirements for members of the
group. Each member in the group belongs to the group at some level l, binding it to a
row in both A and O. Members of the Trusted Domain, such as all of those in P belong
to the group at the highest possible level, the highest-numbered row of A and O. New
members are accepted at the lowest level, l = 0. Each row of the Capabilities Matrix,
corresponding to some level, contains a list of the actions which a group member may
take at that level. Any actions that the group allows that are not listed at that level are
prohibited for members at that level. A given row of the Policy Matrix lists the extent
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to which members at that level must exercise some capabilities, and the extent to which
members must limit their use of others. These matrices, and in particular the values of
orenewal and oupgrade, are discussed at length in the following section.
2.2 Admission Process
Given the Trusted Domain P , let us examine what happens when some new node nwishes
to join the group. To begin with, n must have generated, as prerequisite, only a pub-
lic/private key in order to join; there is no other requirement. First, n requests the Group
Charter from any of the nodes in P . Assuming n finds the contents of the GC to its liking,
it sends a GMC Request (GMCREQ ) signed with its private key to at least t members of
P . The GMCREQ contains the following.
Figure 2.2: GMCREQ Attributes
• A Level Level
• A Start time Start.
• An Expiration time Notafter.
TheGMCREQ is an X.509Request [28] containing some of these values as X.509v3
extensions [12], while others are included in the message in which the GMCREQ is sent.
The node n sets the value of Level to 0, as this is its initial request to join the group. Start
is set to the Universal Coordinated (UTC) time. The value of Notafter determines when
the certificate expires. Each list of policy elements ol ∈ O contains one element that
determines for how long a GMC at that level is valid. The value of Notafter is simply
calculated by adding this element to Start to begin with.
This is the first point at which admission is controlled by way of using t as a proxy. If
no t members find n acceptable as a new member, it cannot obtain membership. Members
of P would consider any prior knowledge of n that they might have, as well as checking
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the values sent by n in its GMCREQ . Recall that the number of malicious nodes is less
than t for P making it impossible for a malicious coalition in P to approve members
arbitrarily. If fewer than t members decline to admit n, membership is denied. Having
declared n admissible, at least t members of P sign a Group Membership Certificate
(GMC) for n constructed from the GMCREQ and using the same values.
Two elements of the Policy MatrixO are required to be defined for each Group Charter
at all levels. For some level l the element ol,renwal defines a renewal time in seconds that
is added to the current time, when each GMC is issued, to arrive at an expiration time
for each GMC. The element ol,upgrade marks the minimum time that a node must have
participated in the group before it will be considered for membership at level l.
As the last section mentioned, the level l is used to refer to a set of policy elements ol,
and a set of capabilities elements al to which n is to be held until the certificate expires
at Notafter. Each of these matrices specifies the way in which all honest nodes in the
group will allow other nodes to make use of their resources. If n requested some resource
and the capabilities matrix for their level did not allow access, any honest node receiving
this request would reject it. Or, for example, if the policy matrix specified that up to
a particular number of messages of some type may be sent, and n sent more than the
allowed number to some host y, then y would refuse future messages from n.
While its GMC is valid, n must only attempt to make use of the capabilities granted
to it by al. Should n try exceed its capabilities, as we describe above, any node receiv-
ing such a message from n would fail the message, record the event, and refuse further
messages from n. The same is true for elements in the policy matrix. On the other hand,
should n fail to meet the requirements of the policy matrix by not sending enough of some
message, the result would be slightly different; this outcome is addressed shortly. In all
cases, the recipient of some message can be sure that some message originated from n
because such a message would be signed by n using its private key.
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Before Notafter elapses and its certificate expires, n must apply for a new GMC.
This process is essentially the same as the initial application with a few differences. The
value Notafter is again arrived at by taking the current time and adding the expiration
time from the policy matrix to it. Again, the GMCREQ is constructed, and submitted
to each of the (at least) t nodes pi ∈ P with whom n has interacted. Each pi evaluates
n, checking to see that it has exceeded no ai ∈ A, has met all oi ∈ O and has not
exceeded any oi ∈ O. So long as this is true, all honest nodes pi ∈ P partially sign 1.1 the
GMCREQ submitted by n. As we can see here, n is thus required to behave in accordance
with both matrices with at least t other nodes. In this way, t is used as a proxy, forcing n
to interact, and do so honestly.
If n has violated either the capabilities or policy matrix for some honest pi, this node
would refuse to sign, and n would be unable to acquire its new GMC. Therefore it is in
the advantage of n to interact with, and request its GMCREQ of more than t nodes in
order to tolerate some misbehavior during GMC renewal. Specifically, if n can interact
with 2t− 1 nodes, it can guarantee successful renewal1.
After n has participated at level l for the time period ol+1,upgrade, it may make a
GMCREQ of P for membership at a higher level. So long as, just as above, n has partic-
ipated in accordance with the matrices, its request would be approved. For each increase
in l, n will be granted an increasing subset of capabilities from A, and held to a stricter
and more demanding set of policy elements from O. By way of controlling the progres-
sion of new members through the various levels of A and O, members of P are able to
control the extent of the trust they give to new members. Over time, after participating for
oN,upgrade, n could request and be approved for the maximal level l, effectively joining P
as a full member. Once approved, n may request a share of the group secret key S. A
share of S is calculated for n in accordance with policy, and the signature scheme used,
1Recall the assumption that no more than t− 1 malicious nodes exist in the chosen environment
16
and is securely dealt to n.
2.3 Iterative Use of the Model
While the model has been designed to function in an entirely ad-hoc manner, this is not
necessarily where it can be most powerfully applied. Consider two peer groups Px and Py
where entrance (membership at level 0) into Py requires membership in Px at the highest
level (lN ). Some node n at lN in Px applying for membership to Py has been observed to
be honest for some extended period of time by the Trusted Domain of Px. Given that, the
t nodes of Py considering n for entrance at level 0 may have a considerably higher basis
for accepting n at level 0 than the t nodes of Px that presumably had no prior knowledge
of n.
By iteratively requiring membership in other groups in this way, a hierarchy of peer
groups can be built with groups at the top of the hierarchy having increasing confidence
in the honesty of new nodes. This is an intentional quality of kour model that once again
follows the social trust model.
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2.4 P2P File Sharing Example
As an example of how the model might be used, consider a Peer to Peer file sharing group
G collaborating to exchange files, as nodes in a Gnutella [8] file sharing network might.
First, we construct a Group Charter to represent the aims of G. Recall from Figure 2.1
that a GC for G will be composed of the following elements.
Figure 2.3: Group Charter Elements for G
• An NxN Policy Matrix O

o0,renwal o0,upgrade . . . o0,N
o1,renwal o1,upgrade . . . o1,N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
oN,renewal oN,upgrade . . . oN,N

• An NxN Capabilities Matrix A

a0,0 a0,1 . . . a0,N
a1,0 a1,1 . . . a1,N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aN,0 aN,1 . . . aN,N

• The Threshold Cryptographic primitive to be used
• The initial threshold t
Let us say that the group G allows for three capabilities: send, receive, and search.
Building the Capabilities Matrix for G based on these possibilities we have:
Level Send Receive Search
1 X
2 X X
3 X X
4 X X X
Table 2.1: Capabilities Matrix for G
For each level l, an X marked for the capability in each column indicates that the
capability given for that column is available. Capabilities with no X are unavailable for
that level. At the first level, looking at Table 2.1, nodes may only send. The next two
levels allow nodes to search as well, and finally the last level allows nodes to receive files.
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Let us say that the policy matrix for G is as follows.
level Bytes Searches Renewal Membership
0 Bytes0 Renewal0 sec
1 Bytes1 ≤ Searches1/min Renewal1 sec Membership1 sec
2 Bytes2 ≤ Searches2/min Renewal2 sec Membership2 sec
3 Bytes3 ≤ Searches3/min Renewal3 sec Membership3 sec
Table 2.2: Policy Matrix for G
Exploring Table 2.2, we see that first of all each of the 4 levels contains 4 policy ele-
ments. Recall that for all levels l, all policy elements must be met for certification at that
level. Each Bytesl refers to the minimum number of bytes that must be sent from some
node n to each Trusted Domain host from whom a GMC will be requested; recall that this
is at minimum t such hosts. For each increase in l, some node n is required to transfer
an increasing number of bytes to each host. Note that meanwhile, n can do nothing but
send files and search. The policy elements at level 0 of the matrix, the first row, can be
considered the entrance fee that a node n must put forward to begin participation in the
group. It is the minimum required policy with with n must comply in order to participate.
At minimum, any node wishing to join G must consider these elements with respect to the
value of t after receiving the GC for the group. Initially, in this example, n can do little
by way of misbehavior. Eventually, at the highest level, n may join the Trusted Domain
and also receive files.
As required by Figure 2.3, each row of the policy matrix includes the two variables
ol,renewal and ol,upgrade which specify the time, in seconds, that a certificate is valid before
it must be renewed, and the time, in seconds, that a node must participate in the group
before it may upgrade to some level l. The variable Renewall specifies the renewal
period, and Membershipl specifies the time before upgrade may occur. By increasing or
decreasing each Membershipl a group may require a very long or very short observation
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period at each level. The longer Membershipl is, the greater confidence members of G
may have that some node n will continue to behave correctly2.
In combination with Bytesl each Renewall implies a rate of transfer that some node
n must meet. If Bytes1 were set to 100 bytes for example, and Renewal1 were set to 100
seconds, then some node n at level l must transfer at least 100 bytes in the renewal period
of 100 seconds, for a rate of at least 100/100 = 1 byte/sec. Note that n must renew its
certificate before expiration, and so would want to send at a rate slightly higher in order
to allow for some time to solicit for and acquire its new certificate.
Consider the selection of t for this example. With four nodes in G, selecting a t of 3
ensures that the greatest number of nodes in G will observe some new member n, while
still tolerating a single malicious node. But, the failure or compromise of any other node
in G renders the shared private key unusable by G. Selecting a t of 2 allows for tolerance
of a single fault or compromise in G. Selecting t as 4 renders the group G incapable of
tolerating any faults or failures. On the other hand, selecting a t of 1 allows maximal
tolerance, but clearly invalidates the use of the threshold, giving all nodes in G the full
authority to sign as G.
In Section 2.5 we discuss all manner of attacks against the model. Here, we consider
one attack against this example. If an attacker n is able to masquerade as t hosts, it
can participate at the highest level in G and acquire t shares of the shared private key,
compromising it and allowing n to sign as G arbitrarily. If the values of Bytesl and
Renewall have been set high enough, it may be possible for the sustained rate in bytes
per second required to masquerade as t nodes to be made to exceed the physical capacity
of n.
Let n be connected to G through some physical connection with a maximum possible
rate of 150bytes/second. Let us say that Bytes3 and Renewal3 are set such that partici-
2See § 2
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pation at level 3 requires a sustained rate of 100bytes/second. In this case, n will not be
able to satisfy this rate more than once, and so will succeed in disclosing more than one
share of the group private key in this way.
In some cases, unique, observable properties of n may assist in guarding against mas-
querading. Binding IP address to the GMC for each node, for example, might make
masquerading more difficult. In some settings, a SIM id3 might exist, which is a much
stronger property that can be used for this purpose. The more unique, and difficult to
forge the property, the stronger it is in in guarding against masquerading. Lacking such
an identifier, the choices made for the policy matrix can still assist in preventing mas-
querading. Care must be taken, however, as setting the policy matrix requirements too
high would limit the types of hosts that could participate in the group.
2.5 Attacks Against the Model
Now we consider a number of attacks against the model. The behavior of any group
member can be modeled given the level at which it is held to the capabilities matrix A
and policy matrix O. Given some l, we know what the member can do, we know to what
extent it can do it, and we know for what length of time. Since the highest level affords
the greatest set of capabilities from A, let us assume that this is where the member can do
the most damage. We will start our analysis by examining two distinct types of possible
attacker behaviors.
We categorize the types of attacks brought against the model into greedy and mali-
cious. A greedy member wishes to do less than is required of it while benefiting as much
as possible from its membership. A malicious member wishes to exceed its privileges,
or use its privileges to the disadvantage of the group. So, a greedy attacker will violate
3Such as can be found in most cell phones, for example.
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some part of the policy matrix O, while a malicious attacker will exceed or abuse its ca-
pabilities from A. Later, we consider an arbitrary attacker that can exhibit these and other
behaviors.
2.5.1 Greedy Members
Let us consider an attacker attackerg modeled under our first example, a group of file
sharing nodes. In this example, the maximum al ∈ A and ol ∈ O allow attackerg
to conduct searches and receive files, while requiring attackerg to share files at some
rate. If attackerg is greedy, it might try to share files at lower than the specified rate, or
search more than the is allowed. Conversely, attackerg might attempt to share greater
than the required Bytesl or search fewer than the maximum allowed number of times.
This behavior benefits the group, and does not benefit the attacker, and is therefore not
considered greedy. Any attempt by attackerg to search beyond what is allowed will be
rejected by any honest member of G, and future requests from attackerg will be ignored.
On the other hand, nodes to whom attackerg is sending files can not know that
attackerg is being greedy by sending less than the required Bytesl until its certificate
expires; until that time attackerg might still satisfy the requirement. Eventually, its cer-
tificate becomes invalid, or attackerg makes a GMC request without having met this
requirement, and all honest nodes refuse any GMC request from attackerg on the basis
of this violation of policy.
In both cases of greedy behavior above, the behavior is tolerated for at mostRenewall.
There is a mechanism by which this time period can be lowered. If G makes use of an
X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [19], t honest nodes who have detected mis-
behavior by attackerg may add its GMC and public key to the CRL. Once the CRL is
propagated, all nodes inGwill refuse requests from attackerg. In this case, greedy behav-
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ior would be tolerated only so long as no t members of G had detected such misbehavior,
and once detected, only so long as required for the CRL to propagate.
2.5.2 Malicious Members
Now we consider a malicious attacker attackerm for the same example. Such an attacker
could try to exceed its capabilities by receiving files or searching before these privileges
were allowed. Just as in the case of a greedy attacker, examination of the GMC for
attackerm would show that these capabilities were not allowed for its level l, and attempts
to make use of these capabilities would be denied, and future requests from attackerm
ignored. Again, if a CRL were used, expulsion of attackerm could occur as immediately
as noted above.
Now, consider the danger that compromise of the group shared secret poses. A ma-
licious attacker might try to masquerade as, compromise, or collude with a sufficient
number of other nodes in order to acquire the group secret key. Recall that t total nodes
must act to compromise of the group shared secret. In our model we assume that no such
t nodes ever exist.
As a rationale for this claim, recall from § 2.4 that masquerading will not succeed
in some environments; if, for example, the group consisted of IP-network nodes, and
each attacker was only able to make use of a single network address. Or if the group
consisted of nodes with observably unique transmission signatures. More generally, any
environment where the attacker cannot forge or acquire more than one unique identifier.
Furthermore, recall that even in the absence of such an identifier, the policy matrix may
be constructed in such a way as to preclude masquerading.
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2.5.3 Collusion
It is not by accident that our solution to the problem of masquerading leaves the attacker
with no choice but to collude with other members. An observation in the development of
the model was that if we can force collusion on the attacker, and at the same time make
collusion very unattractive to honest members, the attacker will be thwarted. The means
by which we provide other members with an incentive not to collude is twofold.
First, by increasing their privileges over time, and making good policy choices, we
can reward well behaved members while not taxing them too severely for their good
behavior. Second, by forcing continued good behavior over time, we build each members’
commitment of resources over time. The idea is that after so much resource commitment
on the part of each honest group member, the rewards afforded by compromise of the
group secret is not worth the risk of losing membership status. This is true as long as the
rewards for attaining higher levels outweigh the benefits of misbehaving at these levels.
This makes choices in the policy and capabilities matrix crucial in order to strike the
appropriate balance.
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Chapter 3
Experimental Design
Above, we suggest a model that we claim can provide security properties and fairness in
a peer group. We hypothesize that the model will provide these properties without signifi-
cant overhead, lending it to use in peer groups with substantial thresholds and membership
counts. We propose to implement the model described in § 2.4 as the basis for the creation
of security mechanisms in a Peer to Peer (P2P) file sharing network. In a later section,
we test the implementation, observing its performance, and confirming correctness of
operation.
Our implementation is built upon the Bouncer Toolkit [1] version 0.7 [3] and con-
stitutes a contribution of greater than 15,000 lines of C code. We begin by discussing the
toolkit, and then proceed to discuss our specific contributions.
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3.1 The Bouncer Toolkit
The Bouncer Toolkit1 is a framework for peer group admission control written in C by a
research team lead by Dr. G. Tsudik [6] at the Secure Network and Computing Center
at UC Irvine. Bouncer is essentially an implementation of the ideas discussed in [27]. It
provides support for the elements seen in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Bouncer Toolkit Provisions
• Creation of a Group Charter
• Static and Proactive secret sharing primitives and other signature schemes
• Admission control (admission, expulsion) using the selected signature scheme
Included in the 0.7 release of the toolkit is support for the following signature schemes.
Figure 3.2: Bouncer Toolkit Signature Schemes
• PS: Plain Signatures
• TS-RSA: A Threshold-shared implementation of the RSA algorithm
• TS-DSA: A Threshold-shared implementation of the DSA algorithm
• ASM: Accountable Subgroup Multisignatures [23]
• GS: Group Signatures
Each of the signature schemes listed in Figure 3.2 is built as a static C library. Bouncer
uses OpenSSL version 0.9.6g [9] which implements the necessary underlying crypto-
graphic primitives such as RSA and DSA and provides the necessary arbitrary precision
math library2. OpenSSL also provides Bouncer with support for the X.509 ASN.1-like
[19] syntax, and ASN.1 [14] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [15] format encod-
ing and decoding. Bouncer includes a packet handling library which implements any
exchanges over IP which may be needed by the signature schemes.
1All comments we make in this section that referencing source line numbers of this toolkit shall apply
to our source release packages rather than the original toolkit.
2This exact version of the toolkit must be used as versions of OpenSSL are not guaranteed to be binary
compatible from one release to the next.
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Furthermore, Bouncer includes a test suite that makes use of each of the signature
schemes and performs admission control for some test group. A setup script generates
the test group to be run. Two daemon processes are required to run a test group. The
Group Authority Daemon (GA) and the Certification Authority Daemon (CA). The CA
is used only for test purposes to sign the Group Charter and perform some other limited
functions; ultimately it is not required by the implementation. The GA, on the other hand,
is required, and it is important to discuss its role as its use fixes the infrastructure and
creates a single point of failure.
The use of the GA is primarily due to the need to accurately keep track of the mem-
bership for some peer group [25]. The problem is a difficult one, and is compounded by
the fully asynchronous, decentralized group setting. The use of the GA ultimately needs
to be deprecated in favor of a better distributed solution analogous to that used by, for
example, Gnutella [8]. Nonetheless, when the GA is run, it prompts the user for various
parameters used to create a Group Charter. Once the Charter is created and signed by the
CA, an automated process, the GA becomes the membership authority mentioned above.
The most important component of the Bouncer test suite is the application server,
called apps. Bouncer is designed to run in test mode on a single system or across a
number of networked hosts. When running across a network, the setup script must be
made aware of the address of each host that will participate in the group, as there is no
discovery mechanism. If the setup script is instructed to create a test mode group, each
host executes on the same machine, and each listens for incoming packets on a base port
plus some offset.
Upon loading, each apps instance contacts the GA downloads the Group Charter, and
is told the current membership count. If the count is above the threshold t selected in the
GC, each member requests a Group Membership Certificate (GMC) from its peers, each
of which then then performs admission per the selected signature scheme. If the count is
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below the threshold t, the host contacts the GA which performs a bootstrap for the host,
with the same result as above3.
Once loaded, the apps do not do very much in this test suite. Their purpose is to serve
as application servers, responding to whatever messages might be sent to them by other
hosts making use of the selected signature scheme. Though limited, their behavior serves
its purpose, which is to exercise the full range of capabilities of the Bouncer Toolkit.
3.2 Our Implementation
First, we broadly outline the behavior of our implementation, and following that we will
detail the work that was done for each significant change to behavior and functionality of
the system.
We selected the Bouncer toolkit for the basis of our implementation after having
worked with the Secure Gnutella [7] sources briefly. We found that the SGnut sources
were themselves too immature, and were based on an earlier version of Bouncer (0.5
[2])4. Bouncer 0.7 appeared to be the more mature, stable choice.
3.2.1 Changes to Setup and Installation Process
The first change in our implementation was a rewrite of the original installation and setup
process. Bouncer 0.7 expected to be installed to the source directory; we rewrote the
installation process to allow for installation to any directory which made deployment and
development much easier5. Once installed, two scripts created a series of test directories
3This statement is limited to all Threshold signature schemes, which we limit our interest to.
4A race condition exists in version 0.1.2 of the SGnut sources which prevents them from working
properly. In cli interface.c:175 a thread is started with the entry point gad main which binds to
and listens on GAD TCP PORT. Shortly afterward, GAD TCP PORT is connected to by the original process
thread; but because no coordination is used, there is no guarantee that gad main is listening on this socket
yet.
5The setup and certgen programs require certain files from the source directory to be present at
runtime which do not get copied to the installation directory.
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from which the test suite could be run. Both were implemented as C programs that out-
putted shell script to a file, and made a system call to execute the resulting shell script.
Furthermore, prompts and output in these scripts was confusing, and generally, the scripts
were fairly fragile. We consolidated them into a single, robust shell script.
3.2.2 Broad Outline of Our Implementation
Once installed and configured using our setup script, the implementation functions as
follows. First, the CA and GA are started. In our implementation, all Group Charter
parameters are specified in the setup process, rather than at GA run time. Then, between
the time periods T0 and T1, n hosts form the Trusted Domain as follows6. First, each
contacts the GA and downloads the Group Charter. Then, each constructs a GMC Request
and submits it to the GA, which checks and approves the request. The GA sends the host
its GMC, and a share of the group secret. Following this, each host waits until T1 has
elapsed, at which point the TD has formed.
Each host, which we will refer to hereafter as a servant, is composed of three pro-
cesses, without which no servant is complete. One subprocess handles all incoming
packets, processing and responding to them. A second implements the honest behav-
ior expected of nodes participating in the group. The third is responsible for occasionally
sending a Ping message to the GA. A Ping is sent after every GMC acquisition so that the
GA always knows which valid nodes are online, and can inform, or respond to requests
to inform, other servants of the current domain topology.
With the Trusted Domain formed, other servants may join. Each servant in the net-
work must send as much data as required of it by the policy matrix. Honest servants will
transmit to as many hosts as their bandwidth allows, and each host has a configured max-
6T0, T1 and n are specified during setup
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imum bandwidth. Any changes in domain topology are transmitted to hosts by the GA.
Any malicious or greedy hosts are blacklisted by each servant when detected.
With the general outline of the behavior above in mind, we now proceed to detail the
changes we made during implementation.
3.2.3 Group Charter Extensions
The Group Charter is an X.509 certificate signed by the CA, containing the following
parameters as X.509v3 extensions.
Figure 3.3: Group Charter Parameters
• Group Name
• Signature Type
• Threshold Type (Static, Dynamic)
• Dynamic Threshold (as a Percent of Membership Count)
• Static Threshold
• Below Threshold Policy (use GA or use all current members)
• Dealer Assignment (GA or Group)
• Policy Matrix
• Capabilities Matrix
• Model Type
• Format of Matrices
We now examine some of the extensions from Figure 3.3. A Below Threshold Policy
may be set only for non-Threshold signature schemes allowing nodes using those schemes
to decide what to do when membership falls below the threshold. Since we are using
a Threshold signature scheme only in our model and implementation, this is ignored.
Furthermore, nodes always make use of the GA when the Trusted Domain is forming
regardless of whether membership count is below threshold, and afterward, it is never
below threshold. Should sufficient members leave causing the count to fall below, the
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group dissolves. In our implementation we chose to use a Static Threshold for testing
purposes, therefore the value of the extension Dynamic Threshold is also ignored.
The Dealer Assignment extension indicates whether the group, or a trusted dealer,
is to bootstrap the shared secret. We take this opportunity to note, importantly, that in
our implementation, we use TS-RSA only, and group bootstrapping is available only to
groups using TS-DSA. Initially we chose TS-DSA for this reason, but we discovered that
in Bouncer 0.7, for what seems to be testing purposes, the TS-DSA implementation
performs a number of operations wherein ultimately the secret is reconstituted at a single
servant7. Using TS-DSA would have meant changing this, and as we discuss in § 3.2.7,
some rewriting of whatever threshold primitive was chosen was known to be required. It
was therefore decided that we make use of the most viable, and only, remaining threshold
primitive which provided a decidedly better starting point.
3.2.4 Implementing the Matrices
Our first change to the Bouncer toolkit was the addition of the last four extensions seen
in Figure 3.3 to the Group Charter. First, this required writing the necessary OpenSSL
callbacks, extending the existing code, and choosing appropriate X.509v3 Object Iden-
tifiers (OIDs) [11]. The next step was to implement code to pull the matrices out of the
GC where they are ASN.1 DER encoded, and make them presentable to the rest of the
servant processes.
Two extensions from Figure 3.3 determine how the matrices are to be encoded and
decoded. First, the Group Charter extension entitled Format of Matrices determines how
the matrices are encoded. In our example we encoded each matrix as ASCII formatted
text using the pipe character to delineate column boundaries, and the space character
7See apps/main.c:542 which calls GAC Secret Recovery and “computes S =∑
ss(i)lagi(0) (mod p)” (libgac/gacLib.c:210)
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to delineate row boundaries. Our implementation is flexible, allowing for the matrices
to be encoded arbitrarily, for example as XML [16] or in a proprietary binary format.
The encoding used is separated from the format for the content of the matrices, which is
described in the extension entitled Model Type.
The combination of these two extensions determines how the matrices are parsed
out of the Group Charter and presented to the application, once they are converted into
OpenSSL native format from their DER encoding. Callbacks are used making the addition
of additional encoding/decoding types trivial. A handler examines the Group Charter, and
calls the appropriate decoder based on the encoding of the matrices; in this case only one
encoder is defined for the format described above. Once decoded, the data are passed to
the decoder specified by Model Type. Again, only one type and handler are defined. The
default decoder turns the matrix into a two-dimensional array of long integers.
3.2.5 GMC Extensions
Figure 3.4: GMC Fields
• Expiration
• Level
• Start
Similar to the extensions we made to the GC, a number of Group Membership Certifi-
cate (GMC) extensions needed to be created. While similar to the GC changes we made
earlier, in this case the GMC used no existing X.509v3 extensions. In particular, we
were concerned with integrating three values into the GMC, each of which can be seen in
Figure 3.4. One of these values was the expiration time of the certificate. Each X.509
certificate includes this parameter as part of the validity field [19], which meant that only
two parameters needed to be added to the certificate as an X.509v3 extensions. The
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Level parameter is the level to which a servant is presently bound. The Start parameter is
the UTC time at which the node was issued its first GMC, and can be used to determine
eligibility for upgrading to higher levels.
We added the necessary functionality to enable these extensions to be added to both
GMC Requests (which are X.509 Requests [28]) and GMCs. A set of helper routines
was created to decode these values from the GMC and present them to the application in
a native format.
3.2.6 Changes to the Bootstrap Process
At runtime, each servant loads the duration of T0 → T1, and the count of the number of
nodes set to participate in the TD, each of which is available in a configuration file. We
changed Bouncer such that two bootstrap processes are used, one for TD nodes (before
T1 expires), and one for non-TD (after T1). If the time period T0 → T1 has not yet
elapsed, and the membership count is below the configured number of Trusted Domain
hosts, nodes request a certificate and share from the GA as they are expected to become
TD nodes. If T1 has elapsed, they make use of a second distributed bootstrap process
wherein t nodes are contacted for a GMC, and participate as non-TD nodes.
Bouncer has more than one bootstrap process as well, but there are significant differ-
ences between our implementation and theirs. Bouncer is designed to bootstrap up to t
nodes, and make use of a below-threshold policy. In our implementation, below threshold
always means that the TD is forming. We make use of a bootstrap period T0 → T1, in
order to guarantee that the Trusted Domain forms as expected. As discussed earlier, when
the TD is formed, the membership count always remains above the threshold unless the
group is dissolving. Importantly, in their implementation of the the TS-RSA protocol, a
share of the group secret is always disseminated along with the GMC. It was therefore
important to alter the protocol to suite our implementation.
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3.2.7 TS-RSA Changes
We changed the TS-RSA protocol implementation in Bouncer so that GMC requests and
Share requests became two different message exchanges. This was an important and
necessary change because in our model, only certain nodes are privileged enough to be
trusted with shares of the secret. Furthermore, while shares were disseminated in Bouncer
to all nodes requesting a GMC, in our model only Trusted Domain (highest-level) nodes
are granted a share of the secret. Obviously some kind of mechanism was necessary to
prevent arbitrary disclosure of secret shares. We implemented this functionality in two
parts, which we now discuss.
3.2.8 Monitor and Tracker
The Monitor and Tracker modules are our means of controlling access to all group re-
sources in compliance with the policy and capabilities matrices. The Monitor is composed
of essentially two parts. First, a set of helper functions check various values against the
matrices. Second, a set of routines exist that are able to determine, from a number of
different factors, whether any given request or operation should succeed. A node must
request a bootstrap, for example, only when the interval T0 → T1 has not elapsed. When a
request to bootstrap is made of the GA, it is the Monitor that ensures that it is the correct
time, and that the number of Trusted Domain nodes is lower than the number that the
setup script configured.
The Tracker module, on the other hand, keeps a log of packets received from all hosts
in the network that are of concern. In particular, each occurance of a send, receive, or
search message is tracked, as well as how much data was sent, and so forth. The Monitor
is also aware of all Tracker data, so that decisions can be made that affect policy such as
how many messages of some type may be sent for each GMC duration.
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Recall that packets are processed by a subprocess dedicated to this task. All packets
logged by the Tracker are handled by a child process spawned by this subprocess. It is
therefore necessary to use some inter-process communication mechanism to share this
data between the components of each servant. We chose to use shared memory segments
and semaphores to affect this. The Monitor is a simpler module and does not need to
record any data with one exception. When a monitor check fails, in many cases a host
will be Blacklisted. Blacklisting a host means all future interactions with that host are
negated. It was necessary to affect a number of changes before blacklisting could be
implemented.
3.2.9 Networking Changes and Blacklisting
Our implementation of Blacklisting functionality required a number of significant changes
to the Bouncer toolkit network layer. First, the implementation was highly fault intoler-
ant. Any failure to send or receive from a network host caused the application to exit with
an error message. This was undesirable, but it quickly became obvious how insecure this
problem really was. Taking down any single host caused the entire network to fail due
to a domino effect where one host went down and others followed as each was unable
to send to some other node. Furthermore, packets were sent from a parent process and
blocked waiting for a response from the recipient, causing whatever the parent was doing
before blocking to be delayed indefinitely.
We added significant fault tolerance to the network infrastructure in the Bouncer
toolkit. By default, any failure to send or receive from a host simply results in that host
being blacklisted. Every blacklisted node is removed from the list of hosts that are to be
interacted with. The Monitor module denies any request of any kind from a blacklisted
host. Each entry on the blacklist is accompanied by a reason, and a timestamp. At a
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number of important points, packets were also made to be sent from a subprocess, so that
blocking was no longer an issue.
We further improved the network layer by making substantial changes to the packet
layer. Initially, in the Bouncer 0.7 implementation, each node was essentially numbered,
and could only rely on nodes less than its number being present in the network, as nodes
were intended to be run in increasing order. This number was the offset, if testing lo-
cally, from a known base port. In networked mode, recall that each node was aware of
the address of all other nodes in the network. Under this design, the GA would act as
a rudimentary discovery mechanism by telling each host the membership count, which
implied the hosts that were active (all hosts up to the membership count).
First, we replaced the test mechanism which used a base port and offset enabling
testing on a single system. Using the IP aliasing capabilities of Linux, the test mechanism
was made to work as follows. Each node on the local system uses the loopback network
device and binds to a network address of 127.0.0.x where x is the offset it would have
used initially. Each host listens on the appropriate address, and when sending to other
hosts, each was made to bind to the correct address.
This may sound simple, but it was an important change for the following reason.
When using testing mode in the Bouncer toolkit, packets received from another node
could not be attributed to that host easily. While each packet arrived on a uniquely differ-
ent port, they were sent from random ports, and all packets were sent from the same IP
address, the loopback address of 127.0.0.1. With this change implemented, not only
could each packet be uniquely attributed to a particular sender by IP address, but using
the suite in testing mode became no different from networked mode; each mode simply
tested a group of network hosts.
The discovery mechanism in Bouncer 0.7 was the very simple implied mechanism
described above. Each host was aware of the membership count and its own number, and
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this implied which other hosts it should expect to be up. We replaced this mechanism
with a Ping process at each servant that sent a heartbeat to the GA each time a GMC was
acquired. The GA was made to be aware of the topology of the network at all times. Any
changes in the topology, as hosts renewed their certificates, or certificates expired, were
propagated to all hosts in the network in a subprocess.
Once a packet is received by the network layer, it is decoded into an internal packet
format and passed to a handler. Once in internal format, the packet did not contain any
information about the sender except what might have been included for some particular
packet type, for example a GMC. The IP address of the sender in particular was lost. We
augmented the packet infrastructure to support some additional information, especially
the IP address or hostname of the sender.
These changes were necessary for the Blacklist functionality to be propagated at all
levels of the system. At a low level, during a send or receive operation to or from a host,
our Blacklist functionality had already been implemented because at that level the IP was
known. At a higher level the protocols that operated at the per-packet level were now
able to use the same functionality, which was then implemented. Finally, packets in the
Bouncer toolkit were always sent by way of a handshake involving a packet sent, and one
received. We changed this so that packets could be sent one-way where no response was
intended.
Signal handling in the Bouncer toolkit was also significantly improved, in particular
as it affected the network layer. Initially, the network handling functions did not tolerate
being interrupted due to receipt of an IPC signal, treating this as failure. We improved
signal handling, enabling the network layer, and other similar functionality, to tolerate
interrupts due to receipt of signals appropriately.
Finally, the toolkit originally used a single handler for all three network processes,
the CA, GA, and servant. This was inappropriate for several reasons. First, the size and
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complexity of each of these programs was increased as all available functionality was
built in to them as the handler was built to handle any incoming packet which might be
handled by any of the signature schemes implemented by the many libraries. Second,
some packets were only ever meant for one of the three processes.
Some packets are only ever exchanged between the GA and CA, and others, in particu-
lar P2P packets discussed in § 3.2.10, are only transmitted between servants. But because
of the use of a single handler, any process might receive any kind of packet, while only
really being able to handle a particular subset. Receiving packets that a process could
not really respond to would cause the process to make an attempt, usually ending in a
crash. We broke the handler apart into three separate ones, with each process handling
only packets which were appropriate for that process.
We conclude discussion of the networking changes by pointing out one change that
was observed as an eventual necessity, but did not make due to its enormity in both time
and complexity. The network layer infrastructure converts packets from internal to on-the-
wire format, and transmits this data. The same infrastructure does the converse, convert-
ing received data back to internal packet format. As implemented this process is highly
volatile, is non-portable both between system of differing endianness, as well as between
processes compiled with differing alignment and padding of certain structures, and is con-
sequently insecure8. For testing purposes, the implementation suffices, but crucially, this
functionality would need to be rethought.
3.2.10 P2P Protocol
One of the biggest portions of the implementation was the construction of a new protocol
simply called P2P which implemented search, send, receive, and other necessary message
exchanges for our application. Each of the messages is accompanied by the GMC of the
8See GAC BuildPacket from libgac/gacSocket.c:187.
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sender, and upon receipt, each packet contains the address of the sender as well. Any
message received can therefore be checked to ensure that the sender is authentic, using
its GMC, and any misbehavior is logged and the host can be blacklisted. Our prototype
network is designed to send fake data rather than actual files for simplicity, but the data is
of the appropriate length with packets being the actual size they would be in a practical
setting.
Our packet and protocol system is built in line with that of the Bouncer toolkit. Packets
are constructed in an internal format with variables stored as ASN.1 types. Before being
transmitted, packets are serialized and written out to a buffer in DER format. When
packets are received, they are tracked, and checked through the Tracker and Monitor
modules.
3.2.11 Changes to Certification Process
In the Bouncer implementation, when the membership count is above the threshold t,
nodes request their GMC from other members of the peer group. This process only occurs
once, and only the nodes numbered 1 through t are solicited during this process9. We
note that this departs from literature10, but is otherwise a satisfactory starting point for
our implementation.
To begin with, we altered the GMC request process so that it could occur any number
of times. Then, we re-wrote the portions of this process that relied on hosts 1 → t to
allow it to make use of a list of any t hosts in the network based soley on their network
addresses. Next, we separated out the TS-RSA share acquisition process, which had
previously occurred in these same messages exchanges(see § 3.2.7). We built this share
acquisition functionality into a similar but separate function.
9See apps/main.c:393 in the original 0.7 sources.
10§6.2 of [25], point 3.
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Apart from these changes, the functionality of each of these processes, share and
certificate acquisition, take place much as they did in the original toolkit. First, a GMC
Request is constructed in the form of an X.509 Request [28]. Next, t hosts are solicited
to ask whether they will sign our certificate, which is sent with the message. Once that is
complete, a list of these hosts is constructed, each of their Distinguished Names is placed
on the list, and the list is submitted to each of the solicited hosts. Each replies with a
partial signature on the GMC, and these are sent to the GA which responds with our new
GMC.
Crucially, the process above departs from literature in two places. First, as suggested
by the model, and [25], when soliciting some GMC request, GMC REQnew, a node n
expects to receive signatures on its new GMC, GMCnew derived from its request. In
fact, a separate, static message transmitted alongside GMC REQnew is signed in the
toolkit11. This is insecure, vulnerable to replay attacks for one thing, but is nonetheless
the mechanism employed by this version of the toolkit. Doubtless this would need to be
fixed in a future version. We chose not to fix this as it is trivially a proxy for what we are
interested in, and ultimately it would not affect the results we were looking for.
Second, literature [25], and our model, suggests that the recipient is to recombine the
partial signatures into the necessary full signature signed by the group private key. The
use of the GA above is detrimental to distributed aims, but is nonetheless how this process
works in practice in the toolkit12. Seemingly this was done for testing or simplification
purposes.
This shortcut, however, was painful to discover, and ultimately use of the GA here
should be superseded by the functionality described in literature. As the hard pieces
of this process, specifically reassembly of the partial signatures, already occurs at the
11See [25] §6.2 point 4, and TSS Get PartSign from libtss/tssProto.c:1210 and
libtss/tssLib.c:53
12See [25] §6.2 point 5, and TSS GMC Reply from libtss/tssProto.c:1378
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recipient, this change would not be particularly hard to implement. Nonetheless given
our time constraints we chose to overlook this issue as, again, it would have virtually no
affect our results.
3.2.12 Behavior
With the fairly lengthy list of changes described above complete, we were ready to im-
plement one of the most important pieces of the model. A behavior process was added to
each servant that performed the expected honest behavior required of each node partici-
pating in the peer group by the policy matrix. Each node transmits the required amount
of data to every other node while its certificate is valid. Only capabilities that may be
made use of are exercised by each honest node. Once the necessary data are exchanged,
the node requests re-certification from the nodes with which it has interacted during this
period.
Each node may be assigned a virtual bandwidth that limits the amount of data it may
exchange per period. Based on this bandwidth, and the threshold t, each node calculates
the number of hosts with which it must interact, and the number with which it is capable
of interacting while still observing requirements of the policy matrix for each host. Each
servant will send to as many as possible to as to tolerate the greatest degree of malicious
behavior during re-certification, but will not spread itself so thin as to jeopardize meeting
its obligation with each other servant.
Each servant tries to wait until it has met its obligation with all of the hosts with which
it is interacting. Should its certificate become in danger of expiring, the servant will cease
waiting and request its GMC from the hosts with which it has already met the obligation
imposed by the policy matrix. If its certificate should be in danger of expiration, and it
has not met this obligation for some reason, the servant continues on in hopes that it will
satisfy the matrix in time. Should it prove unable to do so, it simply gives up.
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GMC requests are made only to hosts with whom the servant has met its obligation;
to do otherwise is considered misbehavior. Any misbehavior by a solicited host during
the re-certification process is tolerated by way of a restart of the process with the host
removed and blacklisted by the servant.
When a sufficient amount of time has passed, according to the policy matrix, a node
may request an upgrade to the next level. This process is the same as re-certification,
but where the extension Level is simply incremented. Before requesting an upgrade to
the next level, a servant will check to ensure that it can meet the requirements of that
level by analyzing the requirements of the policy matrix at this level. If, given bandwidth
constraints, it is unable to operate in the network in the way demanded by the policy
matrix, the servant will disclose that it is limited to its present level, and continue to
operate at the same level ad infinitum.
In addition to the honest behavior described above, we implemented a number of
misbehaviors based on those modeled in § 2.5. Each behavior is enumerated, and by
providing the necessary commandline, a host may be instructed to act out a particular
misbehavior rather than act honestly. Further details are discussed in § 4.2.
3.2.13 Summary
Our work was aimed at providing a robust implementation of the model we describe in
§ 2. At times, implementation of the model was found to be held back by limitations of
the underlying toolkit, many of which were corrected during the implementation process
and are described in the preceding sections. Some of these limitations remain in the
implementation as it stands at the conclusion of our work, however as implemented we
were certainly able to generate the results we are interested in, and validate the model
based on our work. We proceed to discuss this validation process, and the results and the
experimental testing process used to generate them in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Experimental Testing
With the implementation of our Peer to Peer file sharing network complete, we con-
structed a series of laboratory tests to assess the performance and correctness of our im-
plementation. The tests took two forms. First, in order to assess the performance of
our implementation, timer routines were integrated into the code base at different points.
These routines were used to determine the resource utilization, the feasibility of the se-
curity model implemented, and the actual performance of the implementation. Figure 4.1
illustrates the set of measures considered.
• Time between GMC Request and GMC Acquisition at each level.
• Time taken by each peer node to node to partially sign each GMC Request.
• Time taken between request of a share and receipt of the share.
Figure 4.1: List of Operations Measured
Second, a series of validation tests were designed to validate the correctness of the
model. They were designed in such a way that testing will validate the behavior of an
honest node when faced with dishonest behavior. These tests had already been written
into the codebase as an essential part of the implementation of the model, largely as part
of our Monitor module (see § 3.2.8). Testing them required implementing various forms
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of misbehavior, which we did. In § 4.2 we discussed the details of this portion of the
experiment.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Our performance tests were conducted in a laboratory setting as described below. The
validation test were performed locally for a number of group sizes and are described in
§ 4.2. The reason for this difference was a time constraint on the use of the lab. It is worth
noting, however, that as the validation tests simply confirmed correct behavior, it is highly
unlikely that the behavior differed in any way because the tests were done locally. The
same certainly can not be said for the performance tests, which were necessarily done in
the lab.
30 lab machines were available for our tests, each equipped with an Intel Pentium
c© 3 processor, 128 megs of RAM, running Linux kernel version 2.2.x. We settled on
testing groups of size 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 nodes given the available lab environment.
A modulo of 1024 bits was used with the TS-RSA algorithm. A series of scripts were
written that allowed for the automated creation of our test cases, and which automatically
installed the correct test case on each system. The CA and GA were each run on a system
on which a node was also present. Being as lightweight as they were it was thought that
their impact would not affect our results.
For the purposes of our experiment, we assumed that 100 bytes was the average outgo-
ing bandwidth of the nodes being tested. This assignment allowed us to construct Group
Charters with the properties discussed in § 2 and limit behaviors like Masquerading. We
assigned this virtual bandwidth, which we will call B, to each node. Recall the Group
Charter discussed for our P2P network in § 2.4. As discussed in § 3, each node tried to
send to as many Trusted Domain members as it could within the bounds of B.
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Group Charters for each of the test groups were constructed by the following criteria.
For the Bytes element of our policy matrix, we required each host to commit 35% of
B at Level 0, 45% at Level 1, 55% at Level 2, and 65% at Level 3. The rationale for
this selection was that it would burden each node sufficiently to dissuade attempts at
masquerading while not overburdening them to much as to be completely impractical.
Recall that the Bytes field of the Group Charter for our P2P network is the total number
of Bytes that a node a must have received from a node b for a to sign a GMC renewal
request from a. The calculation of this field was done as follows, using level zero for our
example.
First, we took (B/T ) · p% = X , as the number of bytes that a node must have
contributed to any host in the group for its GMC request to be approved, and where p
is the percentage used for each level. Then, taking R to be the number of seconds before
a must renew its certificate, we computed Y = X · R as the total number of bytes that
a must send to each host for each renewal period. Upon receipt of a GMC request, the
host b can simply check whether a has uploaded at least Y bytes, and if so, the request
proceeds.
The Renewal period was chosen as 30 seconds for every level in the experiment in
order to allow nodes to quickly reach the highest level and produce the measurements we
were looking for. Membership in the next level was computed as 3 ·R for all levels above
the first level, and four rounds for the first level, again letting R be the renewal period.
So, each upgrade to the next level required three rounds of participation at the previous
level, with the noted exception above.
The constructed Group Charter for the group of 15 node is presented in Table 4.1 as
an example.
Times T0 to T1 were selected as appropriate given the size of the group to be tested and
the amount of time needed to start the servants. Once the Trusted Domain was established,
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Level Bytes Searches Renewal Membership
0 540 0 30 0
1 1380 3 60 120
2 2520 5 90 300
3 3960 10 120 570
Table 4.1: Group Charter for 15 Node Group
and T1 elapsed, additional nodes were brought into the group every few seconds in order
to distribute the acquisition times to some extent. Over time, varying delays in acquisition
further distributed the expiration times, and had the effect of evening out GMC requests
across each renewal period. A number of Trusted Domain nodes was selected that was
thought to appropriately represent the proportion of TD nodes that might be present for a
particular group size. This number would vary for each Group based on their selection of
a Group Charter.
Our source package contains a number of scripts used during testing which can be
found in the inst directory. Each of these scripts generates one of the test groups
described above by setting the appropriate parameters for the group, and calling the
setup.sh script. The AUTO variable is set in each script, causing the setup script not to
prompt for any unknown values and set reasonable defaults when necessary. The output
resulting from execution of one of the test scripts is a test directory that can be copied on
to, or share between, the nodes that will constitute the test group. Once run, the test group
will generate timing measurements which will be logged to various files. See Appendix A
for a complete explanation of this process.
Each of our test cases was run until all nodes had attained the highest level in the
Group Charter, which was level 3 for all groups. The Trusted Domain was then brought
down, and the data collected and archived. The data acquired during testing was signif-
icant in both size and scope. A presentation and analysis of the results can be found in
§ 5.
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4.2 Validation Tests
Our validation test component was quite different, but no less important, than the perfor-
mance testing. Through our validation tests we sought to confirm the proper functioning
of the implementation by observing the reaction of honest nodes to dishonest behavior;
specifically to those misbehaviors we discussed in § 2.5. We implemented the three cate-
gories of behavior discussed earlier: Malicious, Greedy, and Masquerading. Any node in
the network could be directed to exhibit any behavior at runtime; by default nodes acted
honestly.
Each of the three types of behavior above was enumerated; the list is provided in
Table 4.2 for reference. For each of these three behavior types, the particular ways in
which a node exhibiting that behavior might misbehave was also assigned a number. For
example, a Greedy node might try to send too many search requests, or upload too little,
both of these were enumerated uniquely.
Behavior Type Number
Honest 0
Malicious 1
Greedy 2
Masquerading 3
Table 4.2: Number Assigned to Each Behavior Type
By providing the behavior type and misbehavior number on the command line1, any
node could be directed to misbehave in a specific way and at a specific time. Tables 4.3,
4.4, and 4.5 list the numbers that were chosen for each behavior. A battery of tests was run
during which each of the behaviors was assigned to an appropriate node, and the reaction
of honest nodes during misbehavior was observed. In each table, the Expected Result is
the expected reaction of an honest node to the listed behavior. In all cases, the actual
result was the expectation, confirming the validity of this part of the implementation.
1See Appendix A for a thorough explanation of how to exhibit this behavior
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Each of the misbehaviors listed above required a unique implementation, however
some misbehaviors are always tested for by our implementation. Any P2P Protocol packet
must contain an accompanying GMC which is validated upon receipt of the packet. If the
GMC has expired, is not yet valid, or is not present, the packet is rejected, the behavior is
noted, and the sender is blacklisted. Packets are also checked for proper formatting. If an
improperly formatted packet is received, it is rejected just as above, and the behavior is
noted. These behaviors had been observed and tested for throughout the development and
testing process; it was not necessary to write an implementation for these as was required
by the other more specific misbehaviors. Table 4.3 summarizes the above.
When Behavior Expected Results
Always Invalid or Missing GMC Packet Rejected, Sender BlacklistedImproperly Formatted Packet
Table 4.3: Implicit Validation Tests
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4.2.1 Malicious Validation Tests
We decided that the majority of misbehavior qualified as Malicious. Table 4.4 summarizes
the behavior that a malicious node was allowed to exhibit. The behavior number is listed
in the first column; the column When determined when each behavior was exhibited.
Each of these behaviors was assigned to a node at the appropriate time, and the reaction
of honest nodes to each behavior was observed to be as expected (see Expected Result).
Test Number When Behavior Expected Result
1
T0 to T1 (Bootstrap)
Request early Start
GMC Request Denied, Blacklisted2 Request excessive Expiration
3 Request inappropriate Level
4
Any Time After T1
Attempt to Bootstrap
GMC Request Denied, Blacklisted5 Request early Start
6 Request excessive Expiration
7 Request inappropriate Level
8
Prior to any GMC Request
Attempt to Search at Level 0
GMC Request Denied, Blacklisted9 Attempt to Download at Level 0
10 Attempt to Download at Level 1
11 Attempt to Download at Level 3
Table 4.4: Validation Tests for Malicious Behavior
4.2.2 Greedy Validation Tests
The behaviors listed in Table 4.5 were decided to be Greedy. Just as with the Malicious
behaviors, each of those behaviors listed as Greedy were assigned to a node at runtime,
and the reaction of honest nodes to each behavior was observed to be as expected (see
Expected Result). Again, see § 3.2.12 on the details of how behaviors were implemented
and Appendix A for details on how they can be assigned to a node.
Test Number When Behavior Expected Result
1 Prior to any GMC Request Excessive Search requests GMC Request Denied, Blacklisted
2
Before any GMC Request
Failure to meet Bytes requirement at Level 0
GMC Request Denied, Blacklisted3 Failure to meet Bytes requirement at Level 1
4 Failure to meet Bytes requirement at Level 2
5 Failure to meet Bytes requirement at Level 3
Table 4.5: Validation Tests for Greedy Behavior
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4.2.3 Validation Test for Masquerading
Testing the behavior of a node attempting to Masquerade required a slightly different
approach, but was also a part of our validation testing. Recall from § 4.1 and § 4 that
each node could be assigned a virtual bandwidth that it would not exceed. Recall as well
from our discussions of a P2P file sharing network using the model in § 2.4 the way in
which the Group Charter was constructed. Given the choices made in the policy matrix,
no single host should be able to transmit two times the amount of data required at the
highest level.
In order to test that the implementation properly limited Masquerading as the model
intended, we selected two nodes a and b out of each test group and claimed that they
belonged to a single host which wished to masquerade. The total bandwidth of this host
would be insufficient to fulfill the requirement of the highest level twice. Nontheless,
it was distributed between nodes a and b. Node a was given a sufficient fraction of the
bandwidth to allow it to reach the maximal level in the group, while b was left with the
remainder.
The Trusted Domain was then formed, just as during performance testing, and a and
b were run and directed to masquerade as described above; their behavior otherwise was
that of an honest node. Recall from § 3.2.12 that prior to requesting an upgrade to the
next level, each node tested to see that it could fulfill the requirements of the Policy and
Capabilities matrices at that level. Since node b was given insufficient bandwidth to reach
the highest level, eventually it was unable to pass this test. Our implementation for this
behavior largely consisted of an alert to the user that the node b had become permanently
stuck at its present level. It was able to continue participating in the network, but as
expected, masquerading was limited.
Our implementation behaved as expected in the presence of Malicious, Greedy, and
other behaviors. Our observations during this testing period all coincided with the Ex-
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pected Result portion of Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 from the previous sections. As directed
earlier, the reader can refer to Appendix A for a thorough description of how the tests can
be run. In the next section, a detailed analysis of our results from the first portion of our
experiment can be found.
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Chapter 5
Results and Analysis
In the previous section we detailed our performance testing methodology, and described
how we performed measurements of various key parts of our implementation. We now
present the details of those results, as well as a detailed analysis intended to reveal impor-
tant trends and facts about our work. We begin by presenting a summary of the results.
5.1 Summary of Results
Group Size 5 10 15 20 25 30
Threshold 2 4 6 7 8 9
GMC Acquisition 0.501756 1.136846 1.698270 2.056688 2.447770 2.893956
Partial Signature 0.157661 0.165857 0.168316 0.174676 0.181019 0.187949
Share Acquisition 0.031923 0.068558 0.136361 0.221222 0.328974 0.364317
Partial Share 0.007545 0.009190 0.010694 0.011657 0.012678 0.013203
Table 5.1: Median of All Performance Measurements for all Thresholds and Group Sizes
Table 5.1 summarizes our laboratory measurements for all thresholds and group sizes,
where all values are expressed as the median of the observed results. In this table, we
present the following. GMC Acquisition is the time taken to acquire GMCnew for some
threshold t. Partial Signature is the time taken to issue a partial signature on GMCnew
for some threshold t. Share Acquisition is the time taken to acquire a share by some
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highest-level node for some threshold t. Last, Partial Share is the time taken by some
highest-level node to create a partial share.
By far the greatest time taken above is for the GMC acquisition process, which in-
volves the greatest number of message exchanges, and is perhaps the greatest computa-
tional burden of all the recorded processes. Not unsurprisingly, the operation that took
the second greatest amount of time, from Table 5.1, was Share Acquisition. This process,
similar to GMC acquisition, involves a number of message exchanges, being an aggregate
of a number of Partial Share computations and message exchanges. Both Partial Signa-
ture and Partial Share times, by comparison, were quite small. We explore these and other
observations about our result in the following sections.
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5.1.1 GMC Acquisition Results
GMC Acquisition time is an important benchmark for the performance of our system.
Besides being a common operation, and therefore one which should require as little time
as possible to complete, acquisition time is significant because in large groups, given a
sufficiently short renewal period, if this process takes too long a node will be unable to
acquire GMCnew before its certificate expires.
Group Size 5 10 15 20 25 30
Threshold 2 4 6 7 8 9
GMC Acquisition 0.501756 1.136846 1.698270 2.056688 2.447770 2.893956
Table 5.2: Median GMC Acquisition Time for all Thresholds and Group Sizes
Table 5.2 shows the median time for a node to successfully complete the entire GMC
acquisition process listed by Threshold. Measurement for this metric began before the
node submitted its first Sign Request (see § 3.2.9), and ended when the GMC had been
successfully acquired and verified. This table appears as a graph in Figure 5.1. For each
group, the corresponding threshold selected can be found in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.1: GMC Acquisition Time (sec) vs. Group Size
Figure 5.1 shows what appears to be essentially linear growth of the median time
taken to acquire a GMC at any level for all group sizes. In Figure 5.2 we break this result
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down by level, plotting the median GMC acquisition time at each level for each of the
groups measured.
Figure 5.2: GMC Acquisition Time (sec) by Level vs. Group Size
Note that acquisition at level 3 takes noticeably longer than at the previous level.
Acquisition at level 2 can also be seen, with somewhat more difficulty, to be greater than
that of level 1. In fact, for each increase in level, there is a slight increase in the median
GMC acquisition time. We explore this result later in this section.
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5.1.2 Partial Signature Results
As we saw previously, for each successful GMC request, at least t Trusted Domain mem-
bers must issue a partial signature on the requested GMCnew. Here we examine the
results of our measurement of the partial signature time.
Group Size 5 10 15 20 25 30
Threshold 2 4 6 7 8 9
Median Sign Time 0.157661 0.165857 0.168316 0.174676 0.181019 0.187949
Table 5.3: Median GMC Signature Time for all Thresholds
The median Partial Signature time for all thresholds appeared earlier in Table 5.1 and
is repeated here by itself in Table 5.3 for convenience. Measurement of this result began
upon receipt of a valid signature request, and ended once GMCnew had been successfully
partially signed. A graph of these values appears in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Median Time to Sign GMC (sec) vs. Group Size
The growth of the median signature time as group size and threshold increases appears
essentially linear, and the time taken appears quite small; consider that as t is tripled
between the group of 5 nodes and that of 30, the median signature time increases by less
than 0.03 seconds.
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5.1.3 Share Acquisition Results
The performance of partial share acquisition and share creation time were both measured.
Measurement of this metric began when a host started to solicit the necessary t Trusted
Domain members for partial shares, and ended when the shares had been reconstituted
into a full share of the group secret. In Table 5.4 we see our observations of share acqui-
sition time.
Group Size 5 10 15 20 25 30
Threshold 2 4 6 7 8 9
Share Acquisition 0.031923 0.068558 0.136361 0.221222 0.328974 0.364317
Table 5.4: Median of All Performance Measurements for all Thresholds and Group Sizes
In Figure 5.4 we plot the Share Acquisition time by group size for all levels. Note
that this is an essentially linear operation that grows slightly for each increase in the
Threshold, but remains below even half a second for the greatest threshold recorded.
Consult Table 5.4 for the threshold used for each group.
Figure 5.4: Median Share Acquisition Time (sec) vs. Group Size
Share Acquisition times are not nearly as crucial a measurement as compared to GMC
acquisition time in our work. In our implementation, a share is only acquired once per
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host for the entirety of its participation in the group. We now examine the time taken for
issuance of partial shares.
5.1.4 Partial Share Issuance Results
The results from the previous section detailing the total time taken to acquire the neces-
sary t partial shares. This time was an aggregate of the operation that we now concern
ourselves with, the time taken to issue a partial share for each of the t respondents, above.
Measurement of this quantity began once a partial share request had been received, and
ended once a share request was fulfilled, and a new partial share issued. In Table 5.5 we
see our results from observation of the partial share issuance process.
Group Size 5 10 15 20 25 30
Threshold 2 4 6 7 8 9
Partial Share 0.007545 0.009190 0.010694 0.011657 0.012678 0.013203
Table 5.5: Median Share Issuance Time for all Thresholds and Group Sizes
In Figure 5.5 we plot the time taken to issue each Partial Share by group size for
all levels. Note that, as with Share Acquisition time in the previous section, this is an
essentially linear operation that grows slightly for each increase in the Threshold, but
takes a total time that is marginal; for the greatest threshold recorded, this operation took
only slightly over a one-hundredth of a second. The threshold used for each of the groups
in Figure 5.5 can be found in Table 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Median Share Issuance Time (sec) vs. Group Size
Both partial share and partial share issuance occurred very quickly in our implemen-
tation, especially by comparison to the GMC times. Furthermore, while GMC acquisition
is the most frequently occurring operation measured, partial share acquisition is the least
frequently occurring, as it happens at most once for every host in the peer group that
manages to become a member at the highest level.
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5.2 Timing Analysis
In the previous sections we concluded that the most significant operation of those mea-
sured was the GMC Acquisition process, given both the time it took to complete, and
the frequency of the operation compared to others. In this process, t partial signatures
on some GMCnew were issued. This operation was clearly the most expensive of those
observed, and given its importance to the overall functioning of the model and implemen-
tation, we wish to explore it more completely.
In this section we endeavor to reconstruct the process of GMC Acquisition as the sum
of its parts. We construct a formula expressing the timing of the process, and use it to
approximate our own results, in order to determine its accuracy. Later, we make use of
this formula again in approximating results for group sizes and thresholds greater than
those that were observed during experimentation.
5.2.1 Overview of GMC Acquisition
Figure 5.2, which graphed the GMC acquisition time for all group sizes by level, showed
that while apparently linear, the GMC acquisition time in fact grew slightly for each
increase in the threshold, t. Let us explore this result.
Recall that for each successful GMC acquisition, t partial signatures must be obtained.
This process occurs as follows in our implementation1. First, a node A solicits at least
t members of the Trusted Domain, asking them to commit to signing its GMC. Then, A
constructs a Commit List containing t nodes out those nodes who agreed to sign. As stated
by Narasimha et al. in [25] this preliminary round is necessary to establish the list used
in Lagrange Polynomial coefficient calculation2.
Following construction of its Commit List, A contacts each host on the list, requesting
1It occurs in the same manner in the Bouncer toolkit.
2The construction of this list is addressed in § 5.3 where improvements to the process are suggested
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that they certify its GMCnew by issuing the required partial signatures. Once t partial
signatures are received A sends its request for a GMC to the GA, which responds with
the new GMC for A3.
Figure 5.6: A Timing Diagram for the Process of GMC Acquisition
A timing diagram for the acquisition process can be seen in Figure 5.6. Encapsulated
between two long horizontal arrows from left to right lie the communication rounds that
A must go through in acquiring GMCnew. Below this is a description of the rounds that
must be completed successfully for each GMC acquisition. Failure during the process
can occur for any of the reasons seen above at the top in red, and forces A to restart the
process of acquisition.
So, given this description of the process, and the diagram seen in Figure 5.6, we can
say that the GMC acquisition process is the sum of several operations. Most significantly,
each successful acquisition is comprised of the t partial signatures that are issued. Second,
and also important, is network and packet processing delay that occurs for each of the
message exchanges. Finally, two exchanges contribute to the process which are roughly
constant time: the Commit List exchange, and the final exchange in which the GMC is
acquired from the GA.
3We explore this dependency in § 3.2.11.
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Figure 5.7: Time Taken by Exchanges in GMC Acquisition (sec) vs. Threshold
In Figure 5.7 we see the time taken (in seconds) by each of the exchanges in the GMC
acquisition process plotted against the total time taken. We can draw a number of conclu-
sions from this graph. First of all, our earlier claim that the two exchanges we discussed
above as being roughly constant time proportional to t is clearly legitimatized. Secondly,
the greatest contributor to GMC acquisition time is in fact the partial signature exchanges
as we discussed above. Clearly neither of the constant-time message exchanges above is
a significant contributor to the acquisition process when compared to signature time.
Bearing this conclusion in mind, we proceed to the next section in which we break the
GMC message exchanges down precisely
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5.2.2 Overview of Timing Analysis
We begin our construction of a formula expressing the GMC acquisition process by look-
ing at the greatest contributor to this process, the issuance of Partial Signatures. As we
have said, t such partial signatures are issued for each successful acquisition. Let us call
the time taken to issue a single partial signature tsign, and the aggregate time taken to issue
the necessary t partial signatures for each acquisition signtotal. Finally, for the purposes
of our exploration, let us factor out the GA and Commit List exchanges, as well as network
and packet processing delays, as the constant tconst. Bearing these terms in mind, we can
express the total time taken by some GMC acquisition, tacquire, as in Equation (5.1).
tacquire = (signtotal · t) + (tconst · t) (5.1)
5.2.3 Timing Analysis of Partial Signature
Importantly, it turns out that we can describe signtotal from Equation (5.1) with greater
precision. First, recall that each signature is generated by some node vj present in the
Commit List, vj ∈ (v1, v2, . . . , vn). From Equation (1.5) in § 1.1, we know that each
Partial Signature on some GMCnew submitted by some node vj is calculated as mdj
mod N . Here, the message m is GMCnew, the partial secret key dj is computed as
ssj · lj (0), and ssj is the secret share being used4.
The key to expressing signtotal with greater precision lies in an observation that we
can make regarding the computation of lj (0), which is as follows5 [25].
lj (z) =
t∏
i=1,i6=j
z − i
j − i (mod N) (5.2)
4See § 3.2.11 regarding an important disparity in partial signature generation on GMCnew as imple-
mented in the Bouncer toolkit version 0.7
5Here, j is the index vj from the Commit List.
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For each increase in t, the product lj increases by z−ij−i (mod N). Observe that in
Equation (5.2) the product lj (z) is made up of t − 1 rounds of computation. Let us do
the following. First, we factor out the increase in lj per level as the term δsign. Bearing in
mind that this term is an increase proportional to t given some basis time, let us say that
in the absence of this increase, we have the basis term tsign. Putting the two together, we
can construct Equation (5.3).
signtotal = tsign + ((t− 1) · δsign) (5.3)
Given the observations we have made during experimental testing of our implemen-
tation, we can calculate and assign values to the terms in Equation (5.3) and ultimately
Equation (5.1) based on our results. In the next section, we begin to do so by assigning
values to the terms in our equation for signtotal.
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5.2.4 Determining tsign and δsign
To begin to determine values for tsign and δsign, let us examine the total time taken for
both signing and acquiring a GMC across all group sizes. These values can be seen in
Table 5.6.
Threshold Signature Time Acquisition Time
2 0.157661 0.501756
4 0.165857 1.136846
6 0.168316 1.698270
7 0.174676 2.056688
8 0.181019 2.447770
9 0.187949 2.893956
Table 5.6: Signature and Acquisition Time for all Thresholds
Now we look at the difference in time required to sign a GMC between different group
sizes and different thresholds. Table 5.7 shows the difference between signature times for
the increasing thresholds used.
Difference Between Thresholds Signature Diff
2 and 4 0.004098
4 and 6 0.001230
6 and 7 0.006359
7 and 8 0.006344
8 and 9 0.006930
Table 5.7: Difference in Signature Time Between Groups With Adjacent t
Each value in the Signature Diff column is the increase in time taken to sign from one
threshold to the next. If we select the median from Table 5.7, we then have the median
increase in signature time for each increase in t. Recall that this is what we said δsign
represented, the increase in signature time proportional to t. So, selecting the median as
the value for this term we can say that for our data, δsign = 0.006344 seconds.
We know that δsign appears in the term signtotal exactly t− 1 times. So, δsign should
be present in each of the signature times from Table 5.6 t− 1 times, once for each round
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of computation during Lagrange Polynomial coefficient calculation. We can remove the
term δsign from signtotal by subtracting (t− 1) · δsign out of signtotal.
Table 5.8 shows the original signature times (again for groups with adjacent values of
t) next to which we see this time with the term δsign removed as suggested above.
Threshold Signature Time Signature Time Without δsign Term
2 0.157661 0.151318
4 0.165857 0.146826
6 0.168316 0.136599
7 0.174676 0.136615
8 0.181019 0.136615
9 0.187949 0.137201
Table 5.8: Breaking δsign Out of Signature Time
Taking the median of the column Signature Time from Table 5.6 yields the value
0.136615. We can use this value as the basis for any sign operation, which we have said
is represented by the term tsign.
In summary, through some simple arithmetic we have calculated the two values of
interest based on our sample data as we see them in Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.8: Values of δsign and signtotal
δsign = 0.006344
signtotal = 0.136615
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5.2.5 Extrapolation Using signtotal
Given our assessment of the terms from Equation (5.3), we proceed to make use of these
values in approximating two things. First, we approximate our own data using this equa-
tion, and determine the percent error resultant from a comparison to our actual results.
Second, given that this comparison legitimizes our results for signtotal, we proceed to
approximate signature times for group sizes larger than we were able to experimentally
measure.
Table 5.9 calculates the approximation using signtotal, and shows it against the actual
value along with the percent error between the two.
Threshold signtotal Actual Sign Time Percent Error
2 0.142958 0.157661 9.33%
4 0.155645 0.165857 6.16%
6 0.168332 0.168316 0.01%
7 0.174676 0.174676 0%
8 0.181019 0.181019 0%
9 0.187363 0.187949 0.31%
Table 5.9: Approximated Sign Time and Actual Sign Time
A plot of these values can be seen in Figure 5.9. The greatest percent error can be
seen the groups with t values 2 and 4 respectively. The reasoning for this is that first,
as the group size (and t) increases, the number of samples increases, and so the median
Signature Time becomes more accurate. Second, as t increases, the number of rounds
during Lagrange Polynomial coefficient calculation increases, yielding a more accurate
value for δsign.
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Figure 5.9: Predicted GMC Sign Times (sec) vs. Actual (sec)
Based on the closeness of the fit seen between actual and approximated Partial Sig-
nature times in Figure 5.9, as well as the low percentage of error observed in Table 5.9,
we can conclude that our result for signtotal is an accurate estimation of Partial Signature
time.
Looking at the graph in Figure 5.9, we can see that even for thresholds of over twice
those measured during our experiment, signature times remain as low as a quarter of a
second. Between the least and the greatest of the thresholds used, above, we see that the
total increase in signtotal was less than a tenth of a second. Note that, by contrast, we
have already concluded that the most significant contribution to the acquisition process
was signtotal.
Two factors account for this discrepancy. Recall that t instances of the term signtotal
contribute to tacquire, meaning that the values seen in Table 5.9 appear artificially low.
Multiplying each by the threshold t gives a better idea of how much time the signtotal
operation consumes. Furthermore, each of these instances brings with it transmission and
packet processing delays at both the send and receive end of the exchange. As we will
see later, in computing tconst, these delays become significant as t increases.
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5.2.6 Calculation of tconst
As we mentioned earlier, the constant tconst from Equation 5.1 represents several constant
operations proportional to t for some group size. First, and most importantly, network
and packet processing delays are represented here. Second, the roughly constant-time
operations for GA and Commit List exchanges. We now endeavor to assign a value to this
term based on our data.
We can easily calculate the actual values for tconst; that is, the actual time taken by
the operations that we have said contribute to tconst. Recall that for each successful GMC
acquisition, t partial signatures must be acquired (Equation (5.1)) and that therefore, t
instances of the term signtotal are present in each GMC acquisition time. For each of the
median GMC Acquisition times, then, if we subtract out signtotal exactly t times, we have
arrived at the total time required by the operations in tconst for that threshold. Dividing by
t we arrive at the value of tconst proportional to t.
We call this computation, which appears in Equation (5.4), actual tconst to differenti-
ate it from tconst, although we note that ultimately they represent the same terms.
actual tconst = ttotal − (t · signtotal) (5.4)
In Table 5.10 we perform this computation, and display it alongside each of the vari-
ables used above. Note that in this table, we have used the observed median values for
Signature Time for each threshold rather than our approximation using signtotal so as not
to introduce greater error into the calculation.
We can use Table 5.10, in particular the computed values of actual tconst, as the basis
for our approximation, tconst. It turns out that a rather simple approach to computing this
term yields an accurate result. Because the operations constituting tconst are all linear
proportional to t, we can represent tconst as line of the form y = m · x + b, where x ≡ t.
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Threshold Signature Time GMC Acquisition Time actual tconst
2 0.157661 0.501756 0.093217
4 0.165857 1.136846 0.118355
6 0.168316 1.698270 0.114729
7 0.174676 2.056688 0.119137
8 0.181019 2.447770 0.124952
9 0.187949 2.893956 0.133602
Table 5.10: Determining Values for actual tconst
We simply select b = 0.093217, calculate δy as the difference between the first and last
of our actual tconst values, δx as the difference between the first and last threshold, and
finally m as δy
δx
. Doing so yields Equation (5.5).
tconst = 0.005769t+ 0.093217 (5.5)
We present the fit that this approximation yields, against the actual result, by way of
presenting our final result for the computation of ttotal in the following section.
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5.3 Extrapolation Using ttotal
Having computed each of the terms of ttotal from Equation (5.1), we can finally make
use of this result in approximating GMC acquisition times for group sizes and thresholds
greater than those measured during our experiment. This is important as it will give us an
idea of how the implementation would perform for much larger groups.
Threshold tconst ttotal Actual Percent Error
2 0.104755 0.495427 0.501756 1.26%
4 0.116294 1.087755 1.136846 4.32%
6 0.127832 1.776986 1.698270 4.64%
7 0.133602 2.157940 2.056688 4.92%
8 0.139371 2.563120 2.447770 4.71%
9 0.145140 2.992524 2.893956 3.41%
Table 5.11: Comparing Extrapolated ttotal to Actual
In Table 5.11 we compute ttotal for those thresholds which we have measured during
our experiment. Actual is the actual time taken to acquire a GMC at each threshold, next
to which is a percent error comparing this to the estimate. The greatest percent error can
be seen the groups with t values 2 and 4 respectively.
It is thought that two factors contribute to this outcome. First, as the group size (and t)
increases, the number of samples increases, and so the median Signature Time becomes
more accurate. Second, as t increases, the number of rounds during Lagrange Polynomial
coefficient calculation increases, yielding a more accurate value for δsign. Our approxi-
mations of ttotal can be considered sufficiently accurate given the stable, low percentage
of error in the computation as seen here.
Note that the values of tconst approach those of signtotal which we saw earlier. Con-
sider, for example, that at a threshold of 9, signtotal consumed 0.187363 seconds propor-
tional to t, while above, we see that the same result for tconst consumed 0.145140 seconds
proportionally. And yet, by contrast, in Figure 5.7 we saw that overwhelmingly, signtotal
was the greatest contributing term to ttotal.
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In trying to understand this disparity, it is crucial to recall that packet and network
delays are represented by the tconst term. The contribution that the Commit List and GA
exchanges made was nearly constant. This suggests, then, that the greatest contributing
factor to the magnitude of tconst was network and packet processing delay.
Figure 5.10: Extrapolated GMC Acquisition Time (sec) vs. Actual (sec)
In Figure 5.10 we calculate and plot ttotal for thresholds equal to, and importantly,
greater than those used during our experiment. Note that as the threshold increases to its
maximum of 20 in this figure, ttotal, the total time taken to acquire a GMC, is estimated to
be greater than 9 seconds. Recall from § 4.1 that our selection of a renewal period was 30
seconds for nodes participating at level 0. Clearly, therefore, an acquisition time of nearly
10 seconds, almost a third of time a node has to participate before it must re-certify,
suggests a number of things.
First of all, while an acquisition of this length may be suitable to some environments,
it would certainly not be suited to our implementation as we have discussed it here. It is
crucial to point out that in the Bouncer toolkit, as made use of by our implementation,
the GMC acquisition process occurs entirely serially. That means that a large number of
network and packet processing delays is aggregated into ttotal. By contrast, if this process
were made to be parallel, during signature acquisition, for example, the total delay added
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to ttotal would be the greatest delay in sending, and the greatest delay in receiving to any
host on the Commit List. Bearing in mind that there are t such exchanges, parallelizing
this process would reduce ttotal by a factor of t, a highly significant savings.
Furthermore, the Commit List round of messages can be eliminated reducing the mes-
sage exchange to a single handshake with t hosts. The justification for this is that each
soliciting node is aware of those nodes with whom it has acted in our implementation,
and whom it can reasonably trust to partial sign its request. Should a node reject the re-
quest, the result is the same as if the Commit List round were left in: the node must restart
the process. So, in effect, nothing is lost in this reduction. We note that a Commit List
must still be used in some fashion in the acquisition process, and that it is the message
exchange round that may be eliminated here, rather than the list itself.
Lastly, in reflecting on the subject of reducing ttotal it is useful to point out that, as
originally stated in [25], the Lagrange coefficients may be precomputed. We point out
that, similarly, and perhaps more importantly in this case, they may also be cached. This
could result in significant savings, given the contribution of the signtotal term to ttotal.
Caching, in this case, would mean simply remembering the coefficients for some Commit
List that was used.
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5.4 Comparison to Prior Work
Figure 5.11: GMC Acquisition (sec) vs. Narasimha et al.
In Figure 5.11 we see the median GMC acquisition result for all Thresholds plotted
against the same result taken from an approximation of Narasimha et al. [25]. Imme-
diately obvious is that our median acquisition time is much greater than, and grows at a
much faster rate than that observed by Narasimha et al.
Several explanations can be offered that account for this result. To begin with, we
make the assumption that Bouncer version 0.7, or its functional equivalent, was used
to generate the results seen above, for the purposes of this commentary. Making this
assumption is ostensibly reasonable, given that code to generate their results is present in
this version of their codebase. Importantly, we note that our implementation is measuring
essentially the same thing in this case, which justifies the comparison.
First, by way of explaining the discrepancy between the Narasimha et al. [25] result
and that observed during our own testing, we suggest that the increase is due in large
part to the load that our clients were under, which caused significant network and packet
processing delay. In their implementation, each node is almost certainly idle when any
request is received (see § 3.1). In our implementation, at any given time, a node receiving
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a GMC request has a substantial packet processing load. In part the discrepancy is thought
to be due to the latency between receipt of the packet, and actual processing.
Exacerbating the processing delay is the fact that our implementation maintains a
Tracker module and a series of Monitor checks that execute at least once per packet re-
ceived (see § 3). Each of these extends the turnaround time for any request by performing
their own checks, queries, and so forth. Furthermore, each makes use of locking to coor-
dinate access to a shared data repository amongst asynchronous child processes. Locking
is necessary in this case, but is thought to add substantial delay overhead.
Lastly, we offer the following remarks. Our implementation was designed for com-
pleteness and correctness, and locking mechanisms such as those above tend to require
some optimization to minimize their impact; this was not done given time constraints.
It is thought that optimization of the existing synchronization techniques would have a
noticeable impact on performance in this case.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
We have presented here a solution to the problem of providing fairness and security in
a peer group that provides a number of improvements over prior work. In particular,
configurable tolerance of masquerading, and the use of a trust model to assign privileges
in a discrete, granular manner. We are also able to assure the fair participation of all nodes
in the network, and expel members that act unfairly. This limits the damage that can be
done by dishonest and malicious nodes.
Because we are able to assign privileges with greater granularity than previous mod-
els, we are able to trust nodes in the network only so far as their continued good behavior
warrants. By continuously observing this behavior over time, we are able to increase
our confidence in the continued honest and fair participation of all nodes. Should nodes
choose to act unfairly or dishonestly, our expiration mechanism allows us to limit these
disadvantageous behaviors to some time period. Because our model calls for these pa-
rameters to be defined for each group, our model can be adapted for use in a number of
environments.
At present, our implementation has been validated, but is constrained to working in
groups with small thresholds. In its current state, our implementation is clearly not suited
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to running at large group sizes, or to be more specific, for the kinds of large thresholds
which would be made use of by such groups. We have presented a number of suggestions
both as to why this problem exists. In particular, we believe that the principle performance
constraints are due to the sub-optimality of partial signature issuance, and to our use of
locking mechanisms.
Looking forward, two important changes should be made toward the future of this
research. First, our use of locking mechanisms should be investigated as the chief source
of delay in packet processing, and subsequently as the greatest contributor to delay in
the GMC acquisition process. Second, the partial signature issuance algorithm should be
investigated, and reduced in the manner that we describe in § 5.3.
Furthermore, during our research, a number of problems with the underlying toolkit
were identified, as described in this thesis. Solutions to these would provide both security
and performance improvements. Moreover, during the course of our implementation, a
number of improvements to the toolkit were made which are important to its security
and robustness. These changes should be examined during future implementations, and
integrated.
Since our work was completed, a more recent version of the Bouncer Toolkit, version
0.8, has been released. Importantly, the limitations of version 0.7 of the toolkit which
we describe should be examined in light of this new release. Changes we have made may
benefit this version of the toolkit as well, and moving forward this should be examined.
Ultimately, our results contradicted our hypothesis that the implementation would run
in groups with much larger thresholds. We believe that the reasons for this, however, have
been satisfactorily resolved, and that the suggested solutions will enable the implementa-
tion to run as originally anticipated. For smaller thresholds, our work is able to provide
the security mechanisms we have discussed at the cost of the overhead we have presented
throughout § 5.
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Given that our model is adaptable to a number of other situations, an important future
contribution would be the application of the model to a second environment. At many
points in our implementation the changes necessary to suit a different environment would
be minimal. These changes can be made largely by constructing implementation-specific
Monitor, Tracker, and Behavior modules. Particularly interesting would be results from
an implementation with much larger or smaller re-certification requirements. The balance
between delay in expulsion of non-honest members of the group, and performance cost
due to re-certification could be explored in this way.
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Appendix A
Use of the Implementation
This Appendix gives a brief outline of how to make use of our implementation. Source
code is available from http://wssrl.org.
A.1 Installation
Refer to INSTALL in the source directory for detailed instructions on compilation, and
configuration of the sources. Briefly, it should be done as follows.
./configure --prefix=/install dir
make
make install
Now, the install dir directory has been created, and is used for the remainder of the
use of the programs.
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A.2 Configuration
Once installed, the setup program may be run. The setup script requires the dialog
package be installed [4].
sh setup.sh
The user is prompted for all necessary values required to create and run a test group.
Refer to this document for a deeper understanding of what each of the values means. In
general, the defaults may be used.
In addition to setup.sh, there is a second way to configure and use test groups.
A number of scripts titled 5.sh, 10.sh, and so on are also present in install dir.
These scripts set a number of environment variables, and then call setup.sh which
constructs the desired group automatically. The user may examine the contents of these
scripts to determine how to construct groups in this way.
A.3 Bootstrap
Once a test group is constructed, it is ready to be run. First the two daemon processes
are executed. The GA daemon is executed and passed a script generated by setup.sh
as input. Each must be executed in the directory in which the binaries are found. GNU
Screen [5] makes this process somewhat easier.
cd ca && ./cad
cd ga && ./gad < ga.config
Now, between the selected time periods T0 → T1, the Trusted Domain is bootstrapped
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by starting a number of nodes. The number of nodes that will bootstrap the TD is selected
in setup.sh. Each is started in turn.
cd test/001 && ./servant
cd test/002 && ./servant
cd test/003 && ./servant
A.4 Remaining Members
Now, the user may choose to do one of two things. Either the Trusted Domain has reached
the selected size, and the user may wait until T1 to start the remaining nodes, or the
remaining nodes may be started, and they will delay execution until T1 has elapsed. The
Trusted Domain must be started with the selected number of nodes, otherwise the TD
dissolves.
New servants may be started until each node in the peer group is running. Nodes
participate honestly by default. In order to exhibit non-honest behavior, one of the many
misbehaviors must be selected. This brings us to command-line options for the servant
program.
A.5 Malicious and Greedy Behavior
The first command-line argument to servant is a debug option that enables a delay when
starting certain sub-processes. This value must be set to 0 to disable it unless debugging
is desired. The second argument determines behavior type. Possible values are as seen
in Table A.1. The third argument determines exactly which misbehavior the servant is to
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run. Refer to Tables 4.4 and 4.5 for details on Greedy and Malicious behaviors, and refer
to § 4.2.3 for details on Masquerading behavior.
Behavior Type Value
Honest 0
Malicious 1
Greedy 2
Masquerade 3
Table A.1: Selecting servant Behaviors
As an example, to run Malicious behavior 1 (see Table 4.4) through servant 4, we
invoke it as follows.
cd test/004 && ./servant 0 1 1
Note that some of the behaviors are listed as occurring during T0 → T1. In this case
a servant that is participating in TD formation must run this behavior, as opposed to
trying to elicit the behavior after formation.
A.6 Masquerading
Masquerading behavior is elicited similar to the above, but with a slight difference. Since
there is only a single masquerading behavior (to masquerade), the last argument to servant
in this case is the virtual bandwidth (see § 3.2.12) to be assigned. To cause servants 5 and
6 to masquerade, with servant 5 having bandwidth of 60 bytes/sec and servant 6
having 25 bytes/sec, we execute the following.
cd test/005 && ./servant 0 3 60
cd test/006 && ./servant 0 3 25
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A.7 Bringing it Down
The easiest way to take down the entire peer network once it has run for a sufficient period
of time, if it is running locally, is to send all servant, gad, and cad processes the TERM
signal, which each process handles by cleanly shutting down. This can be accomplished
with
killall cad gad servant
For further details, please see the source code.
A.8 Miscellaneous Details
The Subversion [10] version control system was used to manage changes during this
project. Thanks to Ben Collins-Sussman, Brian W. Fitzpatrick and C. Michael Pilato,
authors of Version Control with Subversion [17].
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